The post-communist NATO
Introduction and methodology
The post-communist NATO members studied here are located in Central Europe (also known as "New" Central Europe: hence, in this context, the term designates those post-communist states in the region, so it does not refer to Germany, Austria or Switzerland) and South-Eastern Europe, respectively.
When discussing the communist past and the post-communist present day, these two regions can be perceived as a single, connected area, and referred to as Central and South-Eastern Europe (hereafter, CSEE), albeit they possess significant differences which mainly arise from the different paths that the CSEE states took in the 1990s. The present economic and institutional crisis has hit the European Union hard (and some of its member states in particular, especially the Baltic states and the Southern members general. The group of post-communist NATO member states studied here is comprised of 13 states, of which two can be characterized as medium-sized European states (Poland and Romania) and the other eleven referred to as more or less small European states (of these states, only the Czech Republic has a population of more than 10 million, and the smallest studied state is Montenegro, with a population of about 600 thousand).
All of these states have some important features in common, which are referred to as common denominators:
• They are post-communist NATO member states.
• Eleven out of the thirteen studied states are both NATO and EU members.
• Most of the analysed states can be referred to as small. This affects their foreign and defence policy capabilities, as well as their behaviour in the international environment.
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• None of these states joined the EU before 2004, with Romania and Bulgaria joining at the beginning of 2007 and Croatia in 2013 (so these are all still "newer" members).
• All of the studied states are more or less dependent on energy imports (and some of them are especially dependent on gas imports from Russia, mostly via transit states Ukraine and Belarus).
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• The region has, especially in the last decade, and more intensely since the Ukrainian crisis, become a theatre for testing of the Western response to the renewed Russian economic and political influence.
• The Visegrad Group represents the core states of "new" Central Europe, or Rumsfeld's "New Europe", whose members support a stronger role of national governments in the EU and oppose the acceptance of refugees as an example of the supranational authorities' will imposed on national governments and societies, which neither uphold a tradition nor have a present willingness to accept refugees that are of different religions and cultures. Public opinion in the Baltic states shows similar attitudes (Lada 2015: 10) .
The gap between the "old" and "new" Europe can be seen in variety of issues -for example, the acceptance of refugees and respect for certain democratic standards. The so-called "illiberal democracy" pursued by the authorities of Hungary and the recent political developments in Poland are probably the best examples that confirm the tendencies in the most recent period.
• A (post-communist) history of certain initiatives and groupings of the studied states (see Table 1 ) has to be noted: the Visegrad Group, the Vilnius Group, "the coalition of the willing" and the Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Initiative. The initiatives either derive from the region itself or were/are sponsored from outside the region, 1 Druláková and Přikryl (2016: 135) showing bandwagoning (towards the USA) and cooperation based on their rational choices (the aspirations towards NATO and EU membership), and certain "shared values" such as anti-communism and, more recently, the defence of European and Christian values (against non-European migrants). (Fuksiewicz and Łada 2015: 4-5) .
2. The willingness to contribute more to defence spending (see Table   2 ), host the anti-ballistic missile shield and demand permanent stationing of NATO troops on their territory. Because of the difference in geostrategic position and the degree of negative views towards Russia, the "Pragmatics", in comparison to the "New Cold Warriors", although NATO members as well, would be expected to be less willing to make efforts to narrow the gap between their actual defence spending and recommendations (a euphemism for the requirements of NATO: two per cent of GDP). It is therefore interesting to observe the defence spending of studied states since 2013, a year before 2014, which already seems to be one of the landmark years in NATO's history due to the events in Ukraine.
3. A staunch pursuit of the diversification of energy supply routes, with Poland and Croatia as forerunners and the Baltic states as supporters. The most important proposal in this initiative is that of a gas pipeline from the Adriatic to the Baltic Sea, which would originate at the proposed (planned) LNG terminal at the Croatian island of Krk, which could be supplied with gas from far away fields, primarily located in the USA and Qatar. Although it seems like a distant future, this plan shows the determination of some CSEE states to lower the dependence on Russian gas. However, the Pragmatics are concurrently still willing to develop the South Stream pipeline with Russia, which would be especially interesting to Bulgaria and Hungary (they are making efforts to diversify supply routes of
Russian gas -hence they want to avoid transit through Ukraine as much as possible), while the New Cold Warriors are eager and very determined to radically decrease the level of dependence on Russian gas. NATO countries, 2009 NATO countries, -2016 NATO countries, (2016 . supply issues, clearly tied to Russia: hence most of these states are dependent on Russian gas imports, which in some cases reaches almost 100 per cent of overall gas supply.
The main contribution of this paper is to study two groups of NATO/EU members from the CSEE in terms of their foreign policy initiatives and compliance with NATO and EU policy towards Russia in the last three years after the evolution of the Ukrainian crisis. Some of the "aberrations"
in compliance of some of the studied states were visible earlier: analysis of Central and South-Eastern Europe: commonalities in the pre-1990s, differences in the 1990s, and similarities and differences in the present day Central and East European states advanced primarily through the prism of NATO, with other elements playing a not so important part as strategic relations." The expression of these relations was clear bandwagoning, to a greater or lesser degree, of the CSEE states towards the USA.
The Visegrad Four comprises the foremost and the oldest post-communist grouping of the four states from the region (initially three, before
Czechoslovakia was dissolved). The Visegrad Four, comprised of the core states of the region, is the most homogenous grouping of the states from the region, with common interests and goals. Belkin et al. (2014: 289) emphasize that members of the Visegrad Four "generally consult closely with one another in attempting to present a unified regional stance within NATO and on issues related to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)". However, as Fawn (2013: 340) points out, the group has not always been so homogeneous: "It has faced inordinate challenges, and, for varying reasons, has even been pronounced dead, and not once but several times".
The Vilnius Group comprises ten ( Central and South-Eastern Europe: A revived "battlefront region" between NATO and Russia
The events in Ukraine, which evolved into a full-scale regime change, showed both deep divisions inside this state and the strategic importance of Ukraine to Russia, which has, in the last two decades, more than once noted which issues represent "red lines" for its vital strategic interests. As Ruehle (2014: 234) Forsberg and Herd (2015: 42) conclude that the acknowledgement of difficulties in the Russia-NATO relationship prior to the Ukrainian crisis does not mean that the break-up of the institutional partnership between Russia and NATO was inevitable and was bound to happen. Drawing a conclusion on the nature of difficulties in NATO-Russia relations, Krickovic (2016: 176-177) Whether the claim about NATO's promises after the German unificationthe so-called no-expansion pledge -is true or not (Wolff 2015 (Wolff : 1104 , the facts remain that NATO has spread to parts of the former geopolitical East and that Russia has had a problem with that ever since the developments started. Consequently, ever since the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe -and, a bit later, of South-Eastern Europe -joined NATO and then the EU, Russia has been searching for ways to re-establish its influence. This process has been parallel to the process of Russia's economic, military and political rising, and evolved concurrently with the Putin era.
Influence through investments into the energy sectors of the aforementioned states, economic ties, loans, political connections with some South-Eastern
European states (Serbia particularly) etc. have been the means of Russia's renewed geo-economic influence, which translates the attempts to reach a strategic parity with the USA in the region, although most of the states in the region are NATO and EU member states. It was obvious that once these states were accepted into NATO/the EU, their strategic and economic positions would be clearly defined, and although there can be slight deviations from the common policies, it is unlikely that a certain state would leave the NATO/ EU bloc to join some Russia-led or sponsored association. and practise cyberattacks and energy cut-offs" (Rachwald 2011: 122-123) .
The problem for NATO in its reactions towards Russia in the Georgian and
Ukrainian crisis lies in the ambivalence of its goals and instruments used. to cancel its future proclaimed mission and return to its original mission/ reason for existence (Teutmeyer 2014: 432) .
Variety in responses to the Russian actions in Ukraine among NATO member states from CSEE
Regarding the strategic and political relations, the situation in Eastern Europe in mid-2017 is probably the worst since the end of the Cold War. Russian ambitions are realized, for now: "the Russian flag still flies over Simferopol, the capital of Crimea; the conflict in Ukraine's Donbas region is now Europe's latest and greatest frozen conflict" (Conley 2015: 28) . Forbrig (2015: 1) Influence of the economic crisis and reliance on Russian gas supply on foreign policy of studied states towards Russia and Eastern Partnership states of studied states on energy imports in percentages (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , data on the dependence of EU member states from the region on gas imports in percentages (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , and data on the percentage of gas imports from Russia in total gas imports for the studied EU member states (2012) are also shown. Source: Eurostat, National Accounts and GDP (2016) . Figure 4: Percentage of gas imports from Russia in total gas imports for the studied EU member states (2012) Source: Clingedaelenergy (2014) .
The Baltic states, Bulgaria and Slovakia are obviously most dependent on gas imports (overwhelmingly from Russia) and are therefore the most vulnerable. This position is especially delicate after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis and the consequent deterioration in relations between NATO and the EU on one side and Russia on the other. The security of gas supplies from Russia for most of these states (except Romania and, partly, Croatia) does not only represent an economic issue: it also represents a national security issue. However, due to the low prices of natural gas and oil, Russia cannot afford not to sell; hence these low prices and sanctions are hurting its economy and depleting its foreign currency reserves.
Poland is still an important transit state for Russian gas, despite the Nord Stream pipeline and the fact that it is anti-Russian oriented. Additionally, most of the states are working, more or less actively, on diversification of its supply routes. So, the "gas card" for Russia is working only to a point and only in combination with the willingness of Pragmatics from the region. Analysis of "leaders " and "slackers" 2012-2015 Analysis has shown that all of the analysed states together had 107 recognized leadership initiatives in the 2012-2015 Scorecards. Almost 40
per cent of all activities were tied to the largest and the smallest states in the region (Poland, 37.9 million inhabitants, 24 activities; Estonia,
million inhabitants, 16 activities). A particular initiative noted by the
Scorecard cannot be quantified -that is, "weighed". Therefore, the number of initiatives is just an indicator of the initiatives' frequency and their geographical orientation, and not of their political and strategic importance or economic value. The EU member states from CSEE were mainly concerned with their own energy dependence, mostly on gas imports from Russia. The 69 recognized leadership initiatives (from a total of 107) devoted to Russia and the wider Europe region shows the importance and connectedness of CSEE EU member states to Russia and the region that lies between the EU and Russia. This is also an indicator of the studied CSEE states' vulnerability to potential problems, originating in their Eastern neighbourhood and Russia.
The reliance on gas imports from Russia influences the foreign policy of the Pragmatics group. Six out of seven "slackers" (a term officially used in the ECFR Scorecards for reprimands received by the state from the EU) noted in 2012-2015 Scorecards for the analysed states cited relations with Russia regarding energy issues (mostly gas supply). Gyarmati (2015: 22) emphasized that Hungary was a key supporter of the Russian-led South
Stream pipeline project; hence it would avoid Ukraine as a problematic transit state and therefore increase the security of its gas supply. Hungary also questioned the rationale of EU sanctions against Russia and in November 2014 announced that it would stop the reverse flow of gas to Ukraine, which was dependent on it at the time.
Hungary's leadership initiatives ("leaders", five out of seven) were primarily oriented towards wider Europe and towards Russia. Hungary received "slackers" for pursuing its own "national interests" that did not necessarily coincide with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. The "slackers" are not so surprising if we consider the fact that Russia remains Hungary's largest trading partner outside the EU, and Hungary's Prime
Minister Orban maintains very good relations with Russia.
The situation on gas supply shows the importance of this issue for the aforementioned states, which were obviously willing to pursue their national security interests, even though they did not fully comply with the guidelines of CFSP. However, most "slackers" (13 out of 69) received by the CSEE NATO/EU states are not connected with Russia and wider Europe. The explanation can be found in the high level of solidarity among the states analysed when it comes to relations with Russia and their efforts to become less dependent on Russia. Russia cannot lose this market, especially since 2014, when the prices of oil have plummeted. On the other hand, these states did not receive "slackers" because they wanted to defy the CFSP.
They were simply putting their national interests (gas supply) ahead of the particular EU policy. Almost half of the "slackers" received by the CSEE NATO/EU member states were in the area of multilateral issues and crisis management. The reluctance of these states concerning their (in)activity in the field of multilateral issues and crisis management can be explained by the lack of capability and financial constraints.
Poland has managed to diversify its foreign policy activities, although more than half of its activities, and the most important ones, were connected with wider Europe and Russia, respectively. Poland was actually the only analysed state that managed to have recognized leadership initiatives in all six areas. None of Poland's "slackers" were received for the relations with Russia and the wider Europe region. Poland's actions towards its eastern neighbours and Russia are heavily influenced by historical experiences and geography. Long borders with Ukraine, Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast, respectively, make Poland the primary frontline state towards Russia.
Estonia, with a population of only 1.3 million, managed to have 16 leadership activities, mostly oriented towards the neighbouring states.
Seven initiatives were recognized in the field of multilateral issues and crisis management. Two of Estonia's initiatives were oriented towards the United States. It is a little surprising that such a small state managed to be so involved in multilateral issues far from its geographical proximity. Estonia's "slackers" were received for those issues far away from its geographical proximity.
Lithuania devoted almost all of its leadership activities (11 of 12) in 2011-2014 to Russia and wider Europe. Therefore, we can conclude that Lithuania primarily focuses its foreign policy initiatives towards its neighbourhood. Lithuania received "slackers" only for activities that were not in its geographical proximity and of strategic importance.
Similar to Lithuania, Latvia had nine activities, of which five were oriented towards relations with Russia and the wider Europe region. Three were devoted to multilateral issues and crisis management, and one to the United States.
The Czech Republic showed 13 leadership roles during the analysed period. Four of these 13 leadership roles were oriented towards Russia.
Another four initiatives were oriented towards wider Europe. The Czech
Republic's other leadership initiatives were oriented towards China, the United States, and multilateral issues and crisis management, respectively.
The Czech Republic did not receive a single "slacker" for its relations with Russia or the wider Europe region. Kratochvil (2015: 15) Slovakia also oriented most of its (seven out of 12) initiatives towards the wider Europe region. Other initiatives were oriented towards Russia, and taken in the field of multilateral issues and crisis management, respectively.
Despite its pragmatism, it is making efforts to diversify its gas supply and lower its dependence on Russian gas and its transit through Ukraine. It has also allowed reverse gas supply to Ukraine (Groszkowski 2015b) . It has shown an incentive for gas integration with the Czech Republic and Austria. It is clearly led by its national interests.
Romania had nine recognized leadership activities, according to the ECFR Scorecard. Five of its activities were devoted to its relations with Russia.
Two were devoted to the wider Europe region. Romania also managed to "collect" 13 "slackers".
Bulgaria showed five leadership activities, and its activities were tied to Russia, multilateral issues and crisis management, and the USA. Despite its pragmatism and interest in the South Stream pipeline, Bulgaria has already introduced an interconnector with Hungary, and should by 2019 introduce one with Poland (Groszkowski 2015b).
Croatia received two "slackers", first for relations with Russia on energy issues in 2014, the second for the issue of development aid and humanitarian aid. The period being analysed is one of the toughest economic periods faced by Croatia was since achieving its statehood, which is also the case with Slovenia. However, Slovenia managed to "collect" seven "slackers" from the EU. Slovenia has two main problems concerning its contribution and following the CFSP. It has its own national interests regarding energy supply (gas from Russia) (Russia Today 2015) and did not want to (or could not) spend more financial and material means to comply with the goals of the CFSP in the field of multilateral issues and crisis management.
Analysis of "leaders" and "slackers" from the ECFR 2016 Scorecard When "slackers" received in 2015 by the CSEE NATO/EU member states are analysed, they are grouped around two areas: the MENA region, and multilateral issues and crisis management. Nine of eleven states received a "slacker" for handling the refugee crisis. The second issue on which the majority of the analysed EU states (except Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia) from the region received a "slacker" was overseas troop deployment -i.e. contribution to multi-national operations. In the areas in which relations with Russia, wider Europe and the USA were analysed, no "slackers" were received.
The results from the Scorecard, though they should be taken with caution, show a continuance of the combination of determinants (geographical position, strategic situation, historical experience, as well as the overall size and capabilities of a particular state) and interests of a particular state that define policies. The response to the migrant crisis of 2015 was certainly more a product of the latter than the former. Overseas troop deployment is a product of both. All of the studied states that showed leadership activity have confirmed the hypothesis that, regarding leadership activity, Analysis of the Scorecard has also shown a difference between Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria, and the other studied states. The three mentioned had fewer than half of their leadership initiatives recognized (for Slovenia and Croatia, there were no recognized leadership initiatives at all) oriented towards Russia, contrary to the other NATO/EU members from the CSEE. We can conclude that the small number of "slackers" received for relations with Russia and the wider Europe, despite the dependence on gas imports from Russia, shows that the NATO/EU member states from the region are, with some modest exceptions, following the guidelines of the CFSP.
Conclusions
Some NATO member states from the CSEE, because of their geographical location and position that causes proximity and intense relations with wider Europe and Russia, as well as their reliance on gas imports from Russia, are in a sensitive position. If a state is almost totally dependent on gas imports from Russia, it has to consider its relations with Russia as a primary foreign policy and national security issue, despite the fact that it may have to follow official NATO and EU policies towards Russia. The pragmatism of the Pragmatics is born of need and opportunity, respectively, as is the hard anti-Russian stance of the New Cold Warriors, which are willing to expose themselves to possible Russian "gas blackmail"; hence they feel the most threatened by Russia, significantly more than the Pragmatics. Relations with Russia are still an important factor for all CSEE NATO/EU states because of Russia's geographical proximity and historical connections, despite the fact that most of the studied states are trying to reduce their vulnerability towards Russia. In these efforts, the Pragmatics are the ones who are trying to maintain good relations with Russia, to pursue their economic interests and ensure their better position for the increase of trade with Russia once the EU abolishes the sanctions. At present, the dependence on gas supply from Russia does not represent a key issue that is making the most dependent states most willing to comply, and vice versa. The answer to this aberration lies in the determinants of their geographical position and heritage, which cannot be changed or even slightly modified. Therefore, the Baltic states, despite being heavily dependent on gas supplies from Russia, are the ones (together with Poland) that are supporting the firmest stance towards Russia because of the situation in Ukraine, as well as against its provocations and possible hybrid warfare in the Baltic region.
The Baltic states are also actively working on reducing their dependence on gas supply from Russia, by developing a floating LNG terminal, Independence, in Lithuania (Teffer 2014) , while a site in Latvia (Skulte) is also being developed. These investments are promoted as activities that are in accordance with the Third European Energy Package. The development of LNG terminals (like the floating one in Lithuania, the terminal in Poland and a prospective on the island of Krk in Croatia) is one possible way to reduce CSEE states' dependence on Russian gas (Dickel et al. 2014: 27-39). It is also one of the most important prospective endeavours of the ABC Initiative. Additionally, oil and consequently natural gas have been relatively cheap in the last three years, driving Russia into serious economic problems. Therefore, Russia at present cannot use gas supply as a means for waging "gas wars". Bulgaria is in a slightly different position, 
